---
title: Potential ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploit
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect via suspicious URI patterns
id: 91e28122-1234-5678-9abc-def012345678
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/04
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    category: web
definition: 'Requirements: Logs must include the full URI query string'
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/Bin/*'
            - 'Authorization='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative access (rare for these patterns)
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - cve.cve-2024-1708
    - ransomware.the-gentlemen
---
title: Mass Data Staging via Archiving Tools
description: Detects mass data staging commonly seen before exfiltration by THEGENTLEMEN affiliates
date: 2026/06/04
author: Security Arsenal
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon or Security logging with command line details'
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\winrar.exe'
            - '\7z.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-m0'
            - '-mx9'
            - 'Compress-Archive'
    filter_legit:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '\Program Files\'
    condition: selection_img and selection_cli and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Administrator backups
level: high
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.collection
    - ransomware.the-gentlemen
---
title: Lateral Movement via PsExec
description: Detects the use of PsExec for lateral movement, a favorite of THEGENTLEMEN for spreading ransomware
id: a3b2c1d0-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
date: 2026/06/04
author: Security Arsenal
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Command line logging enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\psexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-accepteula'
            - '\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - IT Administration
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1021.002
    - ransomware.the-gentlemen

// Hunt for rapid file modification and encryption indicators
DeviceProcessEvents  
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)  
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe")  
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc", "vssadmin", "wbadmin", "bcdedit")  
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName  
| summarize count() by DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine  
| where count_ > 5  
| order by count_ desc

# Hardening & Audit: Check for Scheduled Tasks registered in last 24 hours
# THEGENTLEMEN often uses scheduled tasks for persistence.

$DateThreshold = (Get-Date).AddDays(-1)
$SuspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt $DateThreshold }

if ($SuspiciousTasks) {
    Write-Host "[ALERT] Suspicious Scheduled Tasks found created/modified in last 24h:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $SuspiciousTasks | Format-List TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author
} else {
    Write-Host "[INFO] No suspicious recent scheduled tasks detected." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Audit: Check for Shadow Copy Deletion Attempts
$Events = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4663; StartTime=$DateThreshold} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($Events) {
    $VssEvents = $Events | Where-Object { $_.Message -like '*Shadow Copy*' -or $_.Message -like '*vssadmin*' }
    if ($VssEvents) {
        Write-Host "[ALERT] Shadow Copy manipulation events detected!" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
}


---

# Incident Response Priorities

1.  **T-Minus Detection Checklist:**
    *   **Validate ScreenConnect Integrity:** Audit ConnectWise ScreenConnect logs immediately for CVE-2024-1708 indicators (unusual authentication paths).
    *   **Check for SMB Enumeration:** Look for internal network scanning via `smbclient` or PowerShell `Get-SmbShare`.
    *   **Scheduled Task Audit:** Run the provided PowerShell script; THEGENTLEMEN uses Task Scheduler for detonation.

2.  **Critical Assets at Risk:**
    *   **EMR/EHR Databases:** High-value targets for exfiltration.
    *   **File Servers:** Central repositories for encryption.
    *   **Backup Appliances:** Attackers specifically target Veeam/BackupExec repositories to prevent recovery.

3.  **Containment Actions:**
    *   **Isolate:** Immediately disconnect internet-facing RDP and VPN gateways.
    *   **Disable:** Temporarily disable ScreenConnect and similar remote IT tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer) until patched.
    *   **Credential Reset:** Force reset for all local admin and service accounts, especially those with access to backup systems.

---

# Hardening Recommendations

**Immediate (24 Hours):**
*   **Patch Edge:** Apply patches for CVE-2024-1708 (ScreenConnect) and CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console) immediately.
*   **MFA Enforcement:** Enforce strict MFA on all VPN and remote access portals; hardware tokens preferred over SMS.
*   **Block Macros:** Disable macro execution in Office documents from the internet via Group Policy.

**Short-term (2 Weeks):**
*   **Network Segmentation:** Isolate critical medical/operational systems from the general corporate network to prevent lateral movement.
*   **EDR Deployment:** Ensure EDR coverage on 100% of endpoints and servers, specifically tuning for " PsExec" and "PowerShell EncodedCommand" alerts.
*   **Offline Backups:** Validate that a recent, immutable backup exists and is stored offline or in a WORM (Write Once Read Many) storage tier.