THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware: High-Volume Campaign Targeting Manufacturing & Financials — Detection Rules

Date: 2026-07-16
Source: Ransomware Live (Dark Web Leak Site Monitoring)

Threat Actor Profile — THEGENTLEMEN

THEGENTLEMEN is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that has rapidly accelerated its victim posting cadence. Unlike sophisticated stealth actors, this group favors aggressive, broad-spectrum targeting using known vulnerabilities in perimeter security appliances.

• Aliases: None confirmed at this time.
• Operational Model: RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service). Likely utilizing affiliate networks to gain initial access via CVE exploitation, with the core team handling encryption and leak site operations.
• Ransom Demands: Estimated range: $500,000 – $5,000,000 USD based on victim profiles (mid-market manufacturing and finance).
• Initial Access Vectors: Heavy reliance on exploits for external-facing remote access and security management tools (e.g., ConnectWise ScreenConnect, Cisco FMC, Check Point Security Gateways).
• Double Extortion: Standard practice. Victims are listed on the .onion site with sample data leaks if negotiations fail or deadlines are missed.
• Dwell Time: Short. Based on the rapid posting frequency (multiple per day), the group likely moves from access to encryption within 3-7 days.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sector Targeting

THEGENTLEMEN has launched a indiscriminate but sector-heavy campaign over the last 24 hours.

• Manufacturing (33%): Giraudi Group (IT), Mesto Celakovice (CZ), Tooltec (SE), ALUFE Femszerkezeti Kft (HU). The group appears to be hunting for intellectual property and operational disruption leverage.
• Financial Services (13%): Terry P Moosmann CPA PC (US), Hanseata (DE). High-value targets for sensitive PII/financial data exfiltration.
• Agriculture & Food Production (13%): Vignobles Toutigeac, Terra Vitis (FR).
• Construction & Public Sector: Single hits on Byggelit Sverige (SE) and Landesbibliothek Coburg (DE).

Geographic Concentration

• Primary: Europe (SE, IT, CZ, FR, HU, DE, PT) – 60% of recent victims.
• Secondary: North America (US) and Asia-Pacific (JP, TW).

CVE Correlation & Attack Surface

Current activity strongly correlates with the exploitation of CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEVs). Intelligence suggests affiliates are weaponizing:

1. CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): Used for remote code execution (RCE) on managed service providers (MSPs) and IT helpdesks.
2. CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway): IKEv1 key exchange bypass to penetrate corporate network perimeters.
3. CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall FMC): Deserialization bugs allowing unauthorized command execution on firewall management consoles.

Escalation Patterns

The group posts victims in batches (14+ in 24 hours). This suggests an automated "dump" mechanism or a "holiday" rush by affiliates to meet quotas.

Detection Engineering

SIGMA Rules

The following rules target the specific CVEs and TTPs observed in THEGENTLEMEN's recent campaign.

title: Potential Check Point IKEv1 Improper Authentication Exploit (CVE-2026-50751)
id: 5a7b6c8d-9e0f-1a2b-3c4d-5e6f7a8b9c0d
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-50751 involving异常 IKEv1 packet patterns or authentication bypass attempts on Check Point gateways.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/16
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    product: firewall
    service: checkpoint
detection:
    selection:
        product: 'VPN'
        proto: 'IKE'
        version: 'v1'
    filter_legit:
        src_ip:
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate misconfigured IKEv1 legacy clients
level: high
---
title: ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploit (CVE-2024-1708)
id: b1c2d3e4-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
description: Detects web request patterns associated with the path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/16
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    category: web
detection:
    selection_uri:
        TargetUrl|contains: '/Setup/Configure'
    selection_query:
        TargetUrl|contains: '../'
    selection_method:
        RequestMethod: 'POST'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
---
title: Ransomware Data Staging - Mass File Copy to Hidden Directory
date: 2026/07/16
id: c3d4e5f6-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f-3a4b5c6d7e8f
description: Detects potential data staging activity where a large number of files are copied to a hidden directory, common in pre-exfiltration phases of ransomware like THEGENTLEMEN.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectType: 'File'
        AccessMask|contains:
            - '%%1538'
            - '%%1537'
    filter_folders:
        ObjectName|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\Temp'
    filter_hidden:
        ObjectName|contains: '.'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection and filter_folders and filter_hidden | count(ObjectName) > 50
falsepositives:
    - Antivirus scans
    - System backups
level: high

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

Hunt for lateral movement and credential dumping often following the initial VPN exploitation.

let TimeFrame = 1h;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
// Looking for lateral movement tools and recon
| where ProcessName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("net", "whoami", "nltest", "tasklist", "quser", "hostname", "ipconfig")
// Filter for potential aggressive recon behavior
| summarize count() by DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| where count_ > 5

PowerShell Response Script

Run this on suspected endpoints to identify artifacts of THEGENTLEMEN staging activities.

# Check for unusual scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days (Common persistence mechanism)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | Select-Object TaskName, Author, Date, Actions

# Check for recently modified Volume Shadow Copies (Pre-encryption deletion prep)
$vss = vssadmin list shadows
if ($vss -match "No shadow copies") {
    Write-Host "[INFO] No Shadow Copies found - Possible deletion event." -ForegroundColor Yellow
} else {
    Write-Host $vss
}

# Check for established suspicious RDP connections (Port 3389)
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -LocalPort 3389 | ForEach-Object {
    $process = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    [PSCustomObject]@{
        RemoteAddress = $_.RemoteAddress
        RemotePort = $_.RemotePort
        ProcessName = $process.ProcessName
        PID = $_.OwningProcess
    }
}


---

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist

1. External Perimeter Audit: Immediately scan logs for signatures of CVE-2024-1708 (ScreenConnect) and CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point).
2. MSP Account Review: If using an MSP, demand verification that their ScreenConnect instances are patched against CVE-2024-1708.
3. Anomaly Detection: Hunt for ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe.

Critical Assets for Exfiltration

• Financials: A/P, A/R ledgers, tax documents (Terry P Moosmann CPA PC style targeting).
• Manufacturing: CAD drawings, proprietary schematics, ERP databases (SAP/Oracle).

Containment Actions

1. Isolate VPN: If Check Point gateways are present and unpatched, place them in maintenance mode or block IKEv1 traffic immediately.
2. Disable RDP: Force disable RDP on all domain controllers and file servers if not explicitly required.
3. Revoke Keys: Assume credential dumping has occurred; reset passwords for service accounts and local admins on infected segments.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

• Patch CVE-2024-1708: Apply the ConnectWise ScreenConnect patch immediately. This is the #1 initial access vector for this group currently.
• Disable IKEv1: On Check Point Security Gateways, disable IKEv1 and enforce IKEv2/IPSec to mitigate CVE-2026-50751.
• MFA Enforcement: Ensure phishing-resistant MFA is active on all VPN and remote access portals.

Short-term (2 Weeks)

• Network Segmentation: isolate critical manufacturing OT/IoT networks from the IT corporate network to prevent lateral movement from a compromised office PC.
• Egress Filtering: Block outbound traffic to known TOR exit nodes and non-business IP ranges to hinder data exfiltration.
• Cisco FMC Upgrade: Patch CVE-2026-20131 on all Cisco Secure Firewall Management Centers.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub