TITAN Ransomware: Perimeter Breach Campaigns Targeting Business Services & Construction

---
title: Potential Check Point IKEv1 Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-50751)
id: 42e3a1d2-7b5c-4c8e-9f1a-2b3d4e5f6a7b
description: Detects potential exploitation of Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 improper authentication vulnerability. High frequency of IKEv1 requests or successful VPN establishment without standard auth phases.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/12
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    product: firewall
    service: check_point
detection:
    selection:
        product|contains: 'Check Point'
        action: 'vpn-establish'
        protocol: 'ikev1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IKEv1 VPN configuration (rare in modern environments)
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2026.50751
    - titan
---
title: Suspicious ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Activity
id: 88c4d2e3-6f7a-4b9d-8c2e-3f4a5b6c7d8e
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 via suspicious URI patterns or process execution from the ScreenConnect service directory.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/12
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    category: web
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '../'
            - '%2e%2e%2f'
    selection_process:
        Image|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'cmd.exe /c'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Rare administrative misconfigurations
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - cve.2024.1708
    - titan
---
title: Large Volume Data Staging Prior to Encryption
id: 99d5e3f4-0a8b-5c0e-9d3f-4g5h6i7j8k9l
description: Detects rapid data movement to local staging folders commonly used by ransomware groups like TITAN (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp, ProgramData) prior to exfiltration.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/12
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectType: 'File'
        AccessMask|contains:
            - '%%1538' # WriteData/AppendData
            - '%%4418' # WriteAttributes
    filter:
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp'
            - 'C:\ProgramData'
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$' # Machine accounts rarely stage data like this
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection | count() > 50 and not filter
falsepositives:
    - System updates or legitimate installer processes
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.impact
    - titan

// Hunt for lateral movement and staging indicators associated with TITAN playbook
let TimeFrame = 1h;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
// Look for lateral movement tools
| where ProcessName in~ ("psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "wmic.exe", "powershell.exe")
| extend ProcessCmdLine = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
// Check for flags associated with remote execution or file staging
| where ProcessCmdLine contains "accepteula" 
   or ProcessCmdLine contains "-file" 
   or ProcessCmdLine contains "copy"
// Join with Network events to see if these processes coincide with large outbound transfers
| join kind=inner (DeviceNetworkEvents 
    | where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame) 
    | where RemotePort in (443, 80) or ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAllowed")
    | summarize TotalBytesSent = sum(SentBytes) by DeviceId, Timestamp 
    | where TotalBytesSent > 50000000 // > 50MB threshold
    ) on DeviceId, Timestamp
| project DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessName, ProcessCommandLine, TotalBytesSent, Timestamp

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    TITAN Ransomware Rapid Response Hardening Check
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for signs of VSS manipulation (common in Titan playbook) and enumerates scheduled tasks added in the last 7 days.
#>

Write-Host "[!] Initiating TITAN Threat Hunting & Hardening Check..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for VSS Shadow Copy Deletion Signs (Event ID 10 from VSS)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) Health..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$vssErrors = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Application'; ProviderName='VSS'; Level=2; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-1)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($vssErrors) {
    Write-Host "[ALERT] Critical VSS Errors detected recently (Potential Shadow Copy Deletion):" -ForegroundColor Red
    $vssErrors | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
} else {
    Write-Host "[OK] No critical VSS errors detected in the last 24 hours." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Enumerate Scheduled Tasks created/modified in last 7 days (Persistence)
Write-Host "\n[*] Enumerating Scheduled Tasks modified in the last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$schTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)}
if ($schTasks) {
    Write-Host "[ALERT] Recent Scheduled Tasks found (Investigate for persistence):" -ForegroundColor Red
    $schTasks | Select-Object TaskName, Author, Date, State | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[OK] No suspicious recent scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Check for Anonymous Logons (Indicator of Proxy/VPN abuse)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for Anonymous Logons (Event ID 4624 Type 3)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$anonLogons = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4624; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-4)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'Logon Type:\s*3' -and $_.Message -match 'Account Name:\s*ANONYMOUS LOGON'}
if ($anonLogons) {
    Write-Host ("[ALERT] Found " + $anonLogons.Count + " anonymous logons in last 4 hours. Correlate with VPN/Firewall logs.") -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "[OK] No recent anonymous logons detected." -ForegroundColor Green
}


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