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TypoPrompting Campaign: Aurora Stealer & OctoV2 Distribution via AI Brand Typosquats — OTX Pulse Analysis

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 16, 2026
13 min read

Security Arsenal is tracking a high-volume social engineering campaign, internally referred to as TypoPrompting, that leverages human error and the explosive popularity of generative AI tools to deliver commodity infostealers. According to the latest AlienVault OTX pulse published 2026-11-16, unknown adversaries have registered 186 typosquatting domains across 27 AI brands — including Claude, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Perplexity, Midjourney, and ElevenLabs — to intercept users making simple typing mistakes.

The campaign's primary objective is credential and session theft at scale. Once a victim lands on a typosquatted domain, they are presented with ClickFix-style lures: fake CAPTCHA challenges, browser update prompts, or 'AI assistant installation' dialogs that instruct users to execute hidden PowerShell commands. These payloads deliver Aurora Stealer, Net Guard, Invalid Printer, and OctoV2 — malware families designed to harvest browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, session cookies, and corporate VPN configurations.

The attack chain is deceptively simple: victim mistypes an AI service URL → lands on a convincing clone → ClickFix prompt initiates a PowerShell cradle → stealer payload is fetched and executed → credentials and session tokens are exfiltrated to attacker infrastructure. The use of Microsoft Store-signed browser-hijacking applications and search-hijacking extensions suggests the actors are also investing in persistence and long-term browser surveillance, not just one-off credential grabs.

This campaign represents a maturation of typosquatting from low-skill phishing to a multi-stage, multi-payload distribution framework that exploits trust in AI tools and the speed at which users adopt them. The targeting of Finance, Technology, Healthcare, and Telecommunications sectors indicates the actors are monetizing access to both consumer and enterprise credentials.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Adversary: Unknown. The campaign does not currently align with a named APT group; however, the infrastructure scale, multi-payload staging, and use of signed applications suggest a well-resourced cybercrime operation or an initial access broker (IAB) building inventory for ransomware affiliates.

Malware Families:

  • Aurora Stealer: A .NET-based infostealer sold on dark web forums since 2022. Aurora targets Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers, extracting saved credentials, cookies, autofill data, and cryptocurrency wallet extensions. It also enumerates FTP clients, Telegram sessions, and Steam accounts. C2 communication typically occurs over HTTP/S with encrypted JSON blobs. Persistence is achieved via scheduled tasks or registry Run keys.

  • OctoV2: A modular infostealer and loader observed in late 2025. OctoV2 is notable for its anti-analysis checks (VM/sandbox detection via registry and process enumeration) and its ability to act as a loader for secondary payloads, including ransomware. It uses hardcoded C2 domains and can exfiltrate data via Telegram bots or dedicated panels.

  • Net Guard: Less-documented family; OTX data associates it with browser-hijacking applications signed with Microsoft Store certificates. Likely used for search hijacking, ad injection, and redirecting browser traffic to affiliate or malicious endpoints.

  • Invalid Printer: Observed as a Microsoft Store-signed application that hijacks browser settings and search engines. Acts as a persistence mechanism and traffic monetization vector.

Distribution Method:

  • Typosquatted domains impersonating AI brands (opnai.com, anthropiv.com, cloude.ai, chatlgpt.com, etc.)
  • ClickFix social engineering: fake CAPTCHA or 'verification' pages instructing users to open a terminal or Run dialog and paste a PowerShell command
  • Malicious browser extensions and Microsoft Store apps signed with legitimate certificates

Payload Behavior:

  • PowerShell download cradles (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, Start-Process)
  • Browser credential and cookie theft (Chrome, Edge, Firefox)
  • Cryptocurrency wallet extension targeting (MetaMask, Phantom, etc.)
  • Session token theft (Telegram, Discord, Steam)
  • Search hijacking and browser setting modification

C2 Communication:

  • HTTP/S POST requests to hardcoded domains or IP addresses
  • Telegram bot API for exfiltration (common in Aurora variants)
  • Encrypted JSON or base64-encoded blobs

Persistence Mechanism:

  • Scheduled tasks (schtasks /create)
  • Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run)
  • Browser extension installation with enterprise policies or manual user consent

Anti-Analysis Techniques:

  • VM/sandbox detection (checking for VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU artifacts)
  • Debugger detection (checking IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
  • Delayed execution and environment checks before payload decryption

IOC Analysis

The OTX pulse provides 61 indicators, of which a representative sample of 8 domains has been disclosed:

  • opnai.com — typosquat of OpenAI
  • runawayml.com — typosquat of RunwayML
  • griok.com — typosquat of Grok (xAI)
  • anthropiv.com — typosquat of Anthropic
  • midj0urney.org — typosquat of Midjourney (zero substituted for 'o')
  • chtgpt.com — typosquat of ChatGPT
  • cloude.ai — typosquat of Claude
  • chatlgpt.com — typosquat of ChatGPT

Indicator Types & Operationalization:

  • Domains (61 total): These are the primary detection surface. SOC teams should immediately add these to DNS sinkhole lists, web proxy blocklists, and email gateway URL filters. Use passive DNS and Certificate Transparency (CT) log monitoring to identify additional typosquats beyond the disclosed list.

  • File Hashes (not disclosed in pulse sample): If available, cross-reference with VirusTotal, Hybrid Analysis, and MISP. Look for Aurora Stealer and OctoV2 samples with compilation timestamps aligning with campaign activity (November 2026).

  • URLs (not disclosed): ClickFix lures often use short-lived URLs or compromised legitimate sites. Hunt for PowerShell processes with IEX or Invoke-WebRequest in command lines.

  • IP Addresses (not disclosed): Extract from DNS resolution of the 61 domains. Add to firewall blocklists and network detection signatures.

Tooling for IOC Decoding:

  • DNS Analytics: Use tools like SecurityTrails, PassiveTotal, or VirusTotal to resolve the 61 domains and identify hosting infrastructure.
  • Certificate Transparency: Query CT logs (crt.sh, Censys) for certificates issued to these domains to identify additional subdomains or related infrastructure.
  • Malware Sandboxing: Submit suspicious executables or PowerShell scripts to ANY.RUN, Hybrid Analysis, or Joe Sandbox to extract C2 configurations.
  • Threat Intel Platforms: Ingest the OTX pulse into your TIP (MISP, ThreatConnect, Anomali) for automated IOC enrichment and correlation.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: TypoPrompting ClickFix PowerShell Execution
id: 3e5a1b2c-9f4d-4e8a-b6c1-2d7f9a3e5b8c
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell execution patterns associated with ClickFix social engineering lures used in the TypoPrompting campaign. Adversaries instruct users to paste and execute PowerShell commands from typosquatted AI service domains.
author: Security Arsenal
references:
  - https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware
date: 2026/11/16
modified: 2026/11/16
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1204
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_powershell:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
  selection_commandline:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'IEX'
      - 'Invoke-Expression'
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'Start-Process'
  selection_typosquat_domains:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'opnai.com'
      - 'runawayml.com'
      - 'griok.com'
      - 'anthropiv.com'
      - 'midj0urney.org'
      - 'chtgpt.com'
      - 'cloude.ai'
      - 'chatlgpt.com'
  condition: selection_powershell and selection_commandline and selection_typosquat_domains
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative scripts (unlikely to reference typosquatted domains)
level: high
---
title: Aurora Stealer Credential Theft Behavior
id: 7f2c9a1e-4b8d-4f3a-a5e6-1c9d2b7f8a4e
status: experimental
description: Detects file access patterns associated with Aurora Stealer harvesting browser credentials, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets. Aurora targets Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and popular wallet extensions.
author: Security Arsenal
references:
  - https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware
date: 2026/11/16
modified: 2026/11/16
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1555.003
  - attack.t1539
logsource:
  category: file_access
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_browser_paths:
    TargetObject|contains:
      - '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\'
      - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\'
      - '\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\'
      - '\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data\'
  selection_credential_files:
    TargetObject|contains:
      - 'Login Data'
      - 'Cookies'
      - 'Web Data'
      - 'Local State'
      - 'logins.json'
      - 'key4.db'
  selection_wallet_extensions:
    TargetObject|contains:
      - '\Extensions\nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn'  # MetaMask
      - '\Extensions\bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa'  # Phantom
      - '\Extensions\fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp'  # Binance
  filter_legitimate_processes:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\brave.exe'
  condition: selection_browser_paths and (selection_credential_files or selection_wallet_extensions) and not filter_legitimate_processes
falsepositives:
  - Browser backup utilities
  - Enterprise password management tools
level: high
---
title: OctoV2 Anti-Analysis and Persistence
id: 9d4e7b2a-6c1f-4a8e-b3d5-2f9a7c4e8b1d
status: experimental
description: Detects OctoV2 infostealer anti-analysis checks and persistence mechanisms. OctoV2 enumerates VM artifacts and establishes persistence via scheduled tasks or registry Run keys.
author: Security Arsenal
references:
  - https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware
date: 2026/11/16
modified: 2026/11/16
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1497
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1053.005
  - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_schtasks:
    Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '/create'
      - '/sc'
  selection_registry_run:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\reg.exe'
      - '\regedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'CurrentVersion\Run'
      - 'add'
  selection_vm_artifacts:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'vmtoolsd'
      - 'vboxservice'
      - 'qemu-ga'
      - 'vmware'
      - 'virtualbox'
  condition: (selection_schtasks or selection_registry_run) and selection_vm_artifacts
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software installation in VM environments (rare in production endpoints)
level: medium
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Microsoft Sentinel KQL — TypoPrompting Campaign Hunt
// Hunts for network connections to typosquatted AI domains and suspicious PowerShell execution

let TyposquatDomains = dynamic([
    "opnai.com",
    "runawayml.com",
    "griok.com",
    "anthropiv.com",
    "midj0urney.org",
    "chtgpt.com",
    "cloude.ai",
    "chatlgpt.com"
]);

// Part 1: Network connections to known typosquat domains
let NetworkConnections = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (TyposquatDomains)
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
    | extend DetectionType = "Typosquat Domain Connection";

// Part 2: Suspicious PowerShell execution with ClickFix patterns
let SuspiciousPowerShell = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" or FileName =~ "pwsh.exe"
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("IEX", "Invoke-Expression", "Invoke-WebRequest", "DownloadString", "Start-Process")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (TyposquatDomains)
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
    | extend DetectionType = "ClickFix PowerShell Execution";

// Part 3: Browser credential file access by non-browser processes
let CredentialAccess = DeviceFileEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where FolderPath has_any (
        "\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\",
        "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\",
        "\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\"
    )
    | where FileName in ("Login Data", "Cookies", "Web Data", "Local State", "logins.json", "key4.db")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe"))
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName
    | extend DetectionType = "Browser Credential Access";

// Combine all detections
union NetworkConnections, SuspiciousPowerShell, CredentialAccess
| order by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
# TypoPrompting Campaign IOC Hunt Script
# Searches for evidence of Aurora Stealer, OctoV2, and ClickFix execution artifacts
# Author: Security Arsenal
# Date: 2026-11-16

Write-Host "[+] TypoPrompting Campaign IOC Hunt" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "[+] Searching for Aurora Stealer, OctoV2, and ClickFix artifacts...`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Typosquat domains from OTX pulse
$TyposquatDomains = @(
    "opnai.com",
    "runawayml.com",
    "griok.com",
    "anthropiv.com",
    "midj0urney.org",
    "chtgpt.com",
    "cloude.ai",
    "chatlgpt.com"
)

# Check 1: DNS cache for typosquat domain resolutions
Write-Host "[1] Checking DNS cache for typosquat domain resolutions..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$DNSCache = Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -match ($TyposquatDomains -join '|') }
if ($DNSCache) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found typosquat domain(s) in DNS cache:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $DNSCache | Format-Table Entry, Data, TimeToLive -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No typosquat domains found in DNS cache." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Check 2: Recent PowerShell execution history for ClickFix patterns
Write-Host "`n[2] Checking PowerShell history for ClickFix execution patterns..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$PSHistory = Get-Content "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($PSHistory) {
    $ClickFixPatterns = $PSHistory | Select-String -Pattern "IEX|Invoke-Expression|Invoke-WebRequest|DownloadString" | Select-String -Pattern ($TyposquatDomains -join '|')
    if ($ClickFixPatterns) {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found suspicious PowerShell commands in history:" -ForegroundColor Red
        $ClickFixPatterns | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "    $_" -ForegroundColor Red }
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] No ClickFix patterns found in PowerShell history." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[i] PowerShell history file not found (may be disabled)." -ForegroundColor Gray
}

# Check 3: Scheduled tasks for persistence
Write-Host "`n[3] Checking scheduled tasks for suspicious persistence..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$SuspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
    $_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft\*" -and
    ($_.Actions.Execute -match "powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript" -or
     $_.Actions.Arguments -match ($TyposquatDomains -join '|'))
}
if ($SuspiciousTasks) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found suspicious scheduled task(s):" -ForegroundColor Red
    $SuspiciousTasks | Format-Table TaskName, TaskPath, State -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No suspicious scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Check 4: Registry Run keys for persistence
Write-Host "`n[4] Checking registry Run keys for persistence..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RunKeys = @(
    "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
    "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
)
$SuspiciousRunKeys = @()
foreach ($Key in $RunKeys) {
    if (Test-Path $Key) {
        $Values = Get-ItemProperty -Path $Key -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        $Values.PSObject.Properties | ForEach-Object {
            if ($_.Value -match "powershell|cmd|wscript" -and $_.Value -match ($TyposquatDomains -join '|')) {
                $SuspiciousRunKeys += [PSCustomObject]@{
                    Key = $Key
                    Name = $_.Name
                    Value = $_.Value
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
if ($SuspiciousRunKeys) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found suspicious registry Run key(s):" -ForegroundColor Red
    $SuspiciousRunKeys | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No suspicious Run keys found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Check 5: Browser credential file access (recent modifications)
Write-Host "`n[5] Checking browser credential files for recent unauthorized access..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$BrowserPaths = @(
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data",
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies",
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data",
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Cookies"
)
$RecentAccess = @()
foreach ($Path in $BrowserPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $Path) {
        $FileInfo = Get-Item $Path
        if ($FileInfo.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24)) {
            $RecentAccess += [PSCustomObject]@{
                File = $Path
                LastWrite = $FileInfo.LastWriteTime
                Size = $FileInfo.Length
            }
        }
    }
}
if ($RecentAccess) {
    Write-Host "[i] Browser credential files modified in last 24h (verify legitimacy):" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $RecentAccess | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No recent modifications to browser credential files." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Check 6: Network connections to typosquat domains (active connections)
Write-Host "`n[6] Checking active network connections to typosquat domains..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$ActiveConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {
    $RemoteHost = (Resolve-DnsName -Name $_.RemoteAddress -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).NameHost
    $RemoteHost -match ($TyposquatDomains -join '|')
}
if ($ActiveConnections) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found active connection(s) to typosquat domain(s):" -ForegroundColor Red
    $ActiveConnections | Format-Table LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No active connections to typosquat domains." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Summary
Write-Host "`n[+] Hunt complete. Review any alerts above and escalate to IR if confirmed." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "[+] For enterprise deployment, run this script via your EDR or as a scheduled task across endpoints." -ForegroundColor Cyan

Response Priorities

Immediate (0-4 hours):

  • Block IOCs: Add all 61 typosquat domains to DNS sinkhole, web proxy blocklists, and email gateway URL filters. Extract IP addresses via DNS resolution and add to firewall blocklists.
  • Hunt for Execution: Deploy the Sigma rules and KQL query above to your SIEM/EDR. Focus on PowerShell execution with ClickFix patterns and browser credential file access by non-browser processes.
  • Isolate Affected Endpoints: If any endpoint has accessed a typosquat domain or executed suspicious PowerShell, isolate it immediately and begin forensic imaging.
  • User Notification: If you identify users who visited typosquat domains, notify them immediately and initiate credential reset procedures.

24 Hours:

  • Identity Verification: Aurora Stealer and OctoV2 are credential-stealing malware. Assume all credentials on affected endpoints are compromised. Force password resets for all accounts accessed from affected machines, prioritizing:
    • Corporate email (Office 365, Google Workspace)
    • VPN and remote access credentials
    • Cloud service accounts (AWS, Azure, GCP)
    • Financial and banking credentials
    • Cryptocurrency wallets
  • Session Invalidation: Revoke all active sessions for affected users. Infostealers exfiltrate session cookies, which can be used to bypass MFA.
  • MFA Review: Audit MFA logs for affected accounts. Look for suspicious MFA bypass attempts or session token reuse.
  • Dark Web Monitoring: Initiate dark web monitoring for your organization's credentials. Aurora Stealer logs are often sold on criminal marketplaces within hours of exfiltration.

1 Week:

  • Architecture Hardening:
    • DNS Filtering: Deploy a DNS filtering solution (Cisco Umbrella, Cloudflare Gateway, NextDNS) with typosquatting detection. Enable categories for 'Newly Registered Domains' and 'Typosquatting'.
    • Browser Isolation: Consider remote browser isolation (RBI) for high-risk users or when accessing AI services. This prevents ClickFix lures from executing on endpoints.
    • PowerShell Logging: Ensure PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging are enabled across all endpoints. Forward logs to your SIEM.
    • Application Whitelisting: Implement application control (AppLocker, Windows Defender Application Control) to prevent unauthorized executables from running.
    • Credential Guard: Enable Windows Credential Guard on Windows 10/11 endpoints to protect LSASS memory from credential dumping.
  • User Training: Conduct targeted phishing awareness training focused on ClickFix lures and AI service typosquatting. Emphasize that legitimate services never ask users to execute PowerShell commands.
  • Threat Intelligence Integration: Ingest the OTX pulse into your TIP and set up automated IOC enrichment. Subscribe to AlienVault OTX pulses for the malware families mentioned (Aurora Stealer, OctoV2).
  • Incident Response Retainer: If you don't have an IR retainer, establish one. Campaigns like TypoPrompting can scale rapidly, and having expert IR support on standby reduces dwell time.

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