Recent OTX Pulse data indicates two distinct but high-impact campaigns active as of August 4, 2026. The first involves UAT-11795, a Russian-speaking, financially motivated actor utilizing a "ClickFix" social engineering campaign. This operation targets the finance sector in the US and Europe via trojanized installers for popular collaboration tools (MobaXterm, WebEx, Zoom). The campaign delivers a sophisticated payload mix including Starland RAT, the WLDR Framework, and CastleStealer.
Simultaneously, the Mirage Kitten APT group (linked to espionage) is conducting a focused campaign against Aerospace, Defense, and Government entities in the Middle East and Africa (Egypt, Jordan, Tanzania, Pakistan). This actor utilizes custom malware families—NightLedger, BridgeHead, and ArcBridge—delivered via spear-phishing to establish covert tunneling and persistent C2 channels. Notably, both pulses reference overlapping CVEs, suggesting potential exploitation of unpatched infrastructure as an initial access vector or lateral movement mechanism.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
UAT-11795 (ClickFix Campaign)
- Malware Families: Starland RAT, WLDR Framework, CastleStealer, Remcos RAT.
- Distribution Method: "ClickFix" technique (fake browser errors prompting users to run PowerShell) and trojanized software installers.
- Payload Behavior: Starland RAT provides full remote control; WLDR acts as a modular PowerShell loader; CastleStealer targets cryptocurrency wallets and browser credentials.
- C2 Communication: Likely HTTP/HTTPS using custom User-Agent strings and standard RC4 encryption common to WLDR-based campaigns.
- Persistence: Scheduled Tasks masquerading as software updates and Registry Run keys.
Mirage Kitten (Espionage Campaign)
- Malware Families: NightLedger (Custom Backdoor), BridgeHead (Tunneling), ArcBridge, TWOSTROKE.
- Distribution Method: Highly targeted spear-phishing emails tailored to specific regional industries.
- Payload Behavior: NightLedger focuses on reconnaissance and command execution; BridgeHead establishes covert network tunnels for data exfiltration.
- C2 Communication: Uses covert channeling over legitimate protocols to blend in with corporate traffic.
- Persistence: Likely Windows Service installation and DLL side-loading techniques.
IOC Analysis
The provided indicators primarily consist of CVE identifiers associated with exploit activity. While hashes and network domains are typically included in full exports, the prevalence of these specific CVEs suggests the actors are:
- Scanning for initial access (e.g., Log4J, Follina).
- Escalating privileges (e.g., PwnKit, Dirty Pipe).
Operational Guidance:
- SOC Teams: prioritize these CVEs in vulnerability scanning. Focus on detecting exploitation attempts (EDR alerts regarding memory corruption or suspicious child processes of vulnerable services).
- Tooling: Use Tenable or Qualys for CVE discovery. Use SIEM rules to correlate the listed CVEs with successful process execution on endpoints.
Highlighted CVEs:
- CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit - Linux PrivEsc)
- CVE-2022-30190 (Follina - MSHTA)
- CVE-2022-21894 (BlackLotus - UEFI Bootloader)
- CVE-2021-3493 (Dirty Pipe - Linux)
Detection Engineering
Sigma Rules
---
title: Potential ClickFix PowerShell Execution
date: 2026/08/04
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell commands launched via mshta or browser processes typical of ClickFix campaigns leading to Starland RAT.
references:
- https://blog.polyswarm.io/clickfix-themed-campaign-deploys-starland-rat-and-wldr-framework
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DownloadString'
- 'IEX'
- 'FromBase64String'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.user_execution
- attack.t1204
---
title: Suspicious Software Installer Execution
id: 4b0e2e3c-1a2b-4c3d-8e5f-6a7b8c9d0e1f
date: 2026/08/04
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of MobaXterm, WebEx, or Zoom installers from suspicious directories (User Profile or Temp) associated with UAT-11795.
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\MobaXterm.exe'
- '\WebEx.exe'
- '\Zoom.exe'
- '\DBeaver.exe'
selection_path:
CurrentDirectory|contains:
- '\Downloads\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software updates initiated by users
level: medium
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
---
title: Linux Privilege Escalation via PwnKit (CVE-2021-4034)
id: 5c1f3d4e-2b3c-4d5e-9f0a-1b2c3d4e5f6a
date: 2026/08/04
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts of the Polkit pkexec vulnerability (PwnKit) referenced in NightLedger campaign.
author: Security Arsenal
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/pkexec'
CommandLine|contains: 'GCONV_PATH='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.cve-2021-4034
- attack.t1068
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for ClickFix-related PowerShell activity and suspicious installers
let ProcessEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d);
// 1. PowerShell spawned by browsers or HTA
let ClickFixHunt = ProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ('msedge.exe', 'chrome.exe', 'firefox.exe', 'mshta.exe')
| where FileName =~ 'powershell.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('DownloadString', 'IEX', 'FromBase64String');
// 2. Suspicious Installer execution paths
let InstallerHunt = ProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ('MobaXterm.exe', 'WebEx.exe', 'Zoom.exe', 'DBeaver.exe')
| where FolderPath has_any ('Downloads', 'Temp', 'AppData');
// 3. Unix Auditd for PwnKit attempts (if Linux data is ingested)
let PwnKitHunt = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| where FileName has "pkexec"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "GCONV_PATH";
union ClickFixHunt, InstallerHunt, PwnKitHunt
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName
PowerShell
# Hunt script for Starland/WLDR persistence mechanisms and PwnKit vulnerability check
Write-Host "[+] Checking for Starland/WLDR Persistence Registry Keys..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$paths = @(
"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
"HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
)
$malware_patterns = @("Starland", "WLDR", "CastleStealer")
foreach ($path in $paths) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
Get-Item $path | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Property | ForEach-Object {
$prop = $_
$value = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name $prop).$prop
if ($malware_patterns | Where-Object { $value -match $_ }) {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious persistence found in $path : $prop = $value" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Checking Scheduled Tasks for suspicious actions..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
$_.Actions.Execute -like "*powershell*" -or
$_.Actions.Execute -like "*cmd.exe*"
} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Actions | ForEach-Object {
if ($_.Actions.Execute -match "http" -or $_.Arguments -match "encodedcommand") {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious Task Detected: $($_.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Checking Linux Subsystem or remote hosts for PwnKit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) indication..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Note: This checks the local policy kit version if running on Linux/WSL, otherwise informational for the analyst.
if ($IsLinux -or $IsMacOS) {
$polkit_version = (dpkg -l policykit-1 2>$null) || (rpm -q polkit 2>$null)
if ($polkit_version) { Write-Host "[*] Polkit version info: $polkit_version" }
} else {
Write-Host "[*] Manual check required: Verify linux patch level for CVE-2021-4034 (pkexec) on compromised hosts."
}
# Response Priorities
* **Immediate**:
* Block execution of installers (`MobaXterm.exe`, `WebEx.exe`, `Zoom.exe`) from user-writable directories (`Downloads`, `Temp`) via AppLocker or SRP.
* Patch systems against the high-profile CVEs listed, specifically **CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit)** and **CVE-2022-30190 (Follina)**.
* Block indicators associated with Starland RAT and WLDR frameworks if specific domains/IPs are extracted from full pulse data.
* **24 Hours**:
* Initiate credential reset for users in the Finance and IT departments if CastleStealer infection is suspected.
* Hunt for signs of `NightLedger` or `BridgeHead` persistence on endpoints in the Middle East/Africa regions.
* Review web proxies for "ClickFix" patterns (HTML files with JS causing `mshta.exe` spawns).
* **1 Week**:
* Implement strict application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized trojanized installers.
* Conduct security awareness training focusing on fake browser errors and software update scams.
* Enhance email gateway filtering to detect Mirage Kitten spear-phishing lures targeting the Aerospace/Defense sector.
Related Resources
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