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UAT-8616 & Interlock Cisco Exploits + FAMOUS CHOLLIMA NPM Supply Chain: OTX Pulse Analysis

SA
Security Arsenal Team
May 16, 2026
5 min read

Recent OTX Pulse data reveals a convergence of high-impact cyber-espionage and financially motivated attacks targeting enterprise infrastructure and software supply chains. Three distinct campaigns have been identified:

  1. Cisco Infrastructure Assaults: The sophisticated threat actor UAT-8616 is actively exploiting CVE-2026-20182 (authentication bypass) in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager to deploy webshells (XenShell, Godzilla) and C2 frameworks (Sliver, Behinder). Simultaneously, the Interlock Ransomware Group has weaponized a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2026-20131) in Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) to deploy the GHOSTKNIFE ransomware suite.

  2. NPM Supply Chain Compromise: North Korean threat actors FAMOUS CHOLLIMA are conducting a "Contagious Interview" campaign, distributing malicious npm packages (OtterCookie, BeaverTail) that serve as infostealers and SSH backdoors.

Collectively, these campaigns indicate a shift toward exploiting ubiquitous network management platforms and developer tooling to establish persistent footholds for credential theft and data extortion.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

UAT-8616

  • Target: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN infrastructure.
  • Objective: Initial access, persistence, and resource hijacking (XMRig).
  • Malware & Tools:
    • Webshells: XenShell, Godzilla (JSP-based), Behinder.
    • C2 Frameworks: Sliver, AdaptixC2, gsocket.
  • Techniques: Exploits CVE-2026-20182 for authentication bypass. Uses webshells for direct interaction and deploys crypto-miners (XMRig) to monetize compromised infrastructure.

FAMOUS CHOLLIMA (North Korea)

  • Target: Software developers via npm supply chain.
  • Objective: Credential theft and long-term access to development environments.
  • Malware:
    • OtterCookie / BeaverTail: Infostealers targeting browser data and credentials.
    • InvisibleFerret: SSH backdoor for persistence.
  • Distribution: Typosquatting and dependency confusion on npm. Uses benign wrapper packages to pull malicious dependencies during build processes.

Interlock Ransomware Group

  • Target: Enterprise networks via Cisco FMC.
  • Objective: Data encryption and extortion.
  • Malware:
    • GHOSTKNIFE / GHOSTSABER: Custom ransomware payloads.
    • PlasmaLoader: Initial loader utilizing deserialization exploits.

IOC Analysis

The provided pulses contain actionable indicators across multiple vectors:

  • File Hashes: A SHA256 hash (d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa) associated with UAT-8616 activity has been released. SOC teams should immediately scan endpoints and VMDKs for this signature.
  • Network Infrastructure: The IP address 176.65.139.31 is listed as a C2 node. This IP should be blocked at perimeter firewalls and EDR policies.
  • CVE Identifiers: Priority patching is required for:
    • CVE-2026-20182 (Cisco SD-WAN Auth Bypass)
    • CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC Zero-Day)
    • CVE-2026-20133 (Cisco SD-WAN)

Operationalization: SOC teams should import these IOCs into SIEM correlation engines (e.g., Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk) to trigger alerts on firewall deny logs or EDR detection matches.

Detection Engineering

YAML
title: Potential Cisco SD-WAN CVE-2026-20182 Exploitation Attempt
id: 5c2a1b0d-4e8f-4a1c-9d2f-1a5b6c7d8e9f
description: Detects potential exploitation of Cisco SD-WAN Manager authentication bypass vulnerability via webshell-like activity or specific URI anomalies.
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/16
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sd-wan-ongoing-exploitation/
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: web
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '/webshell'
            - '/admin/api/v1/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative management traffic from known internal IPs
level: high
---
title: Suspicious NPM Package Execution (OtterCookie/BeaverTail)
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
description: Detects execution of node processes spawned by potentially malicious npm packages associated with the FAMOUS CHOLLIMA campaign.
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/16
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://panther.com/blog/tracking-an-ottercookie-infostealer-campaign-across-npm
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\npm.cmd'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'base64'
            - 'iex'
            - 'downloadstring'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate developer build scripts
level: high
---
title: Sliver C2 Beacon Activity
id: 9f8e7d6c-5b4a-3c2d-1e0f-9a8b7c6d5e4f
description: Detects network activity consistent with Sliver C2 beacons associated with UAT-8616.
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/16
author: Security Arsenal
tags:
    - attack.c2
    - attack.t1071
logsource:
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort|between:
            - 8888
            - 9999
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter:
        DestinationIp:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications using high ports
level: medium


kql
// Hunt for known malicious IP connections and process execution
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP == "176.65.139.31"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| extend FullURL = iff(isnotempty(RemoteUrl), RemoteUrl, "N/A")
| order by Timestamp desc
;
// Hunt for suspicious Node.js processes (NPM Supply Chain)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("node.exe", "npm.cmd")
| where FileName in ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex", "Invoke-Expression", "FromBase64String")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc


powershell
# IOC Hunt Script: UAT-8616 Malware Hashes & Persistence
# Requires Admin privileges

$MaliciousHash = "d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa"
$Drives = Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Root

Write-Host "[+] Hunting for malicious hash $MaliciousHash..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

foreach ($Drive in $Drives) {
    try {
        Write-Host "[INFO] Scanning $Drive..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
        Get-ChildItem -Path $Drive -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
        Where-Object { !$_.PSIsContainer } | 
        ForEach-Object {
            $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
            if ($hash -eq $MaliciousHash) {
                Write-Host "[ALERT] Malicious file found: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
            }
        }
    }
    catch {
        Write-Host "[ERROR] Access denied in $Drive" -ForegroundColor DarkGray
    }
}

Write-Host "[+] Checking for suspicious scheduled tasks (Godzilla/XenShell persistence)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { 
    $_.TaskName -match "update" -or $_.TaskName -match "system" -or $_.Actions.Execute -match "powershell" -and $_.Actions.Execute -match "-enc" 
} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, State | Format-Table -AutoSize

Response Priorities

Immediate

  • Block network traffic to/from IP 176.65.139.31.
  • Isolate Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN and FMC appliances; apply patches for CVE-2026-20182 and CVE-2026-20131 immediately.
  • Scan all endpoints for the SHA256 hash d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa.

24 Hours

  • Audit npm package repositories for the presence of OtterCookie, BeaverTail, or suspicious dependencies.
  • Reset credentials for developer accounts and network administrators who may have been exposed to webshells or infostealers.
  • Review SD-WAN and FMC logs for indicators of authentication bypass or unauthorized administrative sessions.

1 Week

  • Implement strict allow-listing for outbound network traffic from network management interfaces.
  • Conduct a architecture review of SD-WAN segmentation to limit lateral movement from exploited management planes.
  • Enforce code-signing requirements for all internal npm packages and build artifacts.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

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