Threat Summary
Recent OTX pulses indicate a surge in distinct but technically similar malware campaigns relying heavily on script-based initial access vectors. An unknown threat actor, exhibiting characteristics of Chinese-speaking operators, is leveraging compromised WhatsApp accounts to distribute weaponized VBScript files delivering ValleyRAT and gh0st RAT. This campaign targets a broad geographic spread with high intensity in Malaysia.
Simultaneously, a distinct campaign targeting the financial sector in Portugal utilizes phishing emails impersonating local entities (e.g., Sapo) to deliver the Lampion banking trojan (a derivative of ChePro). Both campaigns employ multi-stage infection chains characterized by heavy obfuscation (HTML/VBS) and abuse of legitimate system tools or RMM platforms to evade detection. The primary objectives range from remote system control and espionage (ValleyRAT/gh0st) to financial credential theft (Lampion).
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
ValleyRAT & gh0st RAT (WhatsApp Campaign)
- Distribution Method: Malicious VBS files sent via direct WhatsApp messages, disguised as business/financial documents. Initial access may involve compromised user accounts or social engineering.
- Payload Behavior: The VBS acts as a downloader for the RAT payloads. ValleyRAT is known for sophisticated capabilities including screen capture, remote shell, and keylogging. gh0st RAT is a long-standing trojan offering full remote control.
- Persistence Mechanism: Registry run keys and potentially DLL side-loading. The OTX pulse references UAC bypass techniques and RMM abuse, suggesting the malware may hijack remote management tools for persistence.
- C2 Communication: Standard HTTP/HTTPS communication with encoded C2 beacons. gh0st RAT typically uses custom protocols over TCP/HTTP.
- Anti-Analysis: VBS files are often obfuscated. The campaign utilizes ManageEngine Endpoint Central exploitation attempts, suggesting a focus on bypassing enterprise security controls.
Lampion & ChePro (Portugal Campaign)
- Distribution Method: Phishing emails containing ZIP archives. Inside are heavily obfuscated HTML files (often using JavaScript or VBScript embedded within HTML) that act as the first stage dropper.
- Payload Behavior: A Brazilian banking trojan focused on intercepting financial transactions and stealing credentials from browsers. It hooks into specific banking processes.
- Persistence Mechanism: Scheduled tasks and registry modifications common to banking trojans to ensure execution upon system reboot.
- C2 Communication: Connects to C2 servers to retrieve configuration updates and exfiltrate stolen data.
- Anti-Analysis: Heavy use of obfuscation in the HTML/JS stage to evade signature-based detection and static analysis.
IOC Analysis
The provided indicators consist exclusively of file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256).
- Operationalizing IOCs: SOC teams should import these hashes into EDR solutions and SIEM correlation engines. Since these are file hashes, they are effective for post-execution detection and scanning of static file systems (shares, user directories).
- Tooling:
- YARA: Create YARA rules based on the specific hash values or the structural characteristics of the VBS/HTML droppers if behavioral analysis is available.
- PowerShell: Utilize
Get-FileHashcmdlets to scan critical directories (C:\Users\,C:\ProgramData,Downloads) against the provided list. - VirusTotal: Cross-reference hashes to determine prevalence and identify additional relations.
- Gap Analysis: The current pulse data lacks network artifacts (IPs, Domains). Teams should focus on detecting the behavior of these families (script execution, unusual process spawning) as network indicators may change rapidly or be encrypted.
Detection Engineering
---
title: Potential ValleyRAT or Gh0st RAT VBS Execution via WhatsApp
id: 88a31f56-1234-5678-9101-1234567890ab
description: Detects the execution of VBS scripts initiated by WhatsApp or other communication apps, indicative of the active ValleyRAT/gh0st RAT distribution campaign.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/22
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/660d8a2b7f1e4f0a8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.initial_access
- malware.valleyrat
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\WhatsApp.exe'
- '\WhatsAppDesktop.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '.vbs'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative scripts run by users
level: high
---
title: Lampion/ChePro Obfuscated HTML Script Execution
id: 99b42e67-2345-6789-0123-2345678901bc
description: Detects execution of mshta.exe or wscript.exe spawned by a browser or email client, common in the Lampion banking trojan infection chain involving HTML droppers.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/22
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/771e9b3c8f2e5g1h9i0j2k3l4m5n6o7p/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.005
- malware.lampion
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_parent:
ParentImage|contains:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Web-based SaaS applications utilizing local scripts
level: high
---
title: Suspicious ManageEngine Endpoint Central Exploitation Activity
id: aac53f78-3456-7890-1234-3456789012cd
description: Detects suspicious command line arguments associated with ManageEngine Endpoint Central exploitation, often used by ValleyRAT for UAC bypass and lateral movement.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/22
author: Security Arsenal
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- attack.defense_evasion
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains: 'ManageEngine'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ping'
- 'nslookup'
- 'whoami'
- 'net user'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative troubleshooting via the tool
level: medium
kql
// Hunt for IOCs and Script Execution Behavior (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Check for specific file hashes and suspicious script execution
let MaliciousHashes = dynamic([
"02bb20455cc592a69c080abac770ce90", "31037a42ca048e06e69a78f55bc2eff5",
"887ec87e4a19759cad25d4bc0956d2b965d3041d", "f0fde01b1e36503227252f6cb6b3b075f93a2c1a",
"452259dc297f56cf22c7932e8fbcefe821ef9c3127134074fae585f89355d397",
"50c74b468c217776b8890b841baefec8b196b14083a7873a9201c838a8e4c90a",
"036c8f32012abdcb9a389ae9c284da89505e830bca74eb1aa9ea3794b067aab6",
"050e84d134a32ed7c4885a9d57ce37f8ae5f910960b67e2156941961bd5781ba"
]);
// 1. File Creation Events matching Malicious Hashes
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (MaliciousHashes) or MD5 in (MaliciousHashes) or SHA1 in (MaliciousHashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| union (
// 2. Process Creation Events for Script Interpreters (VBS/HTA)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has ".vbs" or ProcessCommandLine has ".hta" or ProcessCommandLine has ".html"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
)
powershell
# IOC Hunt Script for ValleyRAT, Gh0st RAT, and Lampion
# Requires Administrator Privileges for system-wide scan
$TargetHashes = @(
"02bb20455cc592a69c080abac770ce90", "31037a42ca048e06e69a78f55bc2eff5",
"887ec87e4a19759cad25d4bc0956d2b965d3041d", "f0fde01b1e36503227252f6cb6b3b075f93a2c1a",
"452259dc297f56cf22c7932e8fbcefe821ef9c3127134074fae585f89355d397",
"50c74b468c217776b8890b841baefec8b196b14083a7873a9201c838a8e4c90a",
"05d188f071d097f5b6bd8138749b4b14", "0ba93109757776a44de9d8c88baa4963",
"036c8f32012abdcb9a389ae9c284da89505e830bca74eb1aa9ea3794b067aab6",
"050e84d134a32ed7c4885a9d57ce37f8ae5f910960b67e2156941961bd5781ba",
"1541c23f34eb05dfcbede3830741427681d719cee1dfd397a2c04110e0fa81b2",
"1bd347ce5deee3d783a038e2d2d224bc30cc074e0471a3897c5409ce99816dc9"
)
$SearchPaths = @("C:\Users\", "C:\ProgramData\", "C:\Windows\Temp")
Write-Host "[+] Starting IOC Hunt for ValleyRAT/Gh0st/Lampion components..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
foreach ($Path in $SearchPaths) {
if (Test-Path $Path) {
Write-Host "[+] Scanning $Path ..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$FileHash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($TargetHashes -contains $FileHash) {
Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
# Optional: Quarantine logic here
}
# Check SHA256 as well for completeness
$FileHash256 = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($TargetHashes -contains $FileHash256) {
Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS FILE FOUND (SHA256): $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Host "[-] Error accessing $Path : $_" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Hunt Complete." -ForegroundColor Green
Response Priorities
-
Immediate (0-4h):
- Block the execution of
wscript.exeandcscript.exefor non-administrative users via AppLocker or SRP if possible, or restrict via Endpoint policies. - Quarantine any endpoints matching the provided IOCs immediately.
- Block the file extensions
.vbs,.js, and.htain email gateways and web proxies, specifically ZIP archives containing HTML files.
- Block the execution of
-
Within 24h:
- Initiate credential resets for users in the targeted regions (Malaysia, Portugal) who may have interacted with suspicious WhatsApp messages or phishing emails.
- Review ManageEngine Endpoint Central logs for signs of exploitation referenced in the ValleyRAT pulse.
- Conduct threat hunting on endpoints for suspicious persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys) linked to the identified malware hashes.
-
Within 1 Week:
- Enforce macro and script signing policies across the enterprise.
- Implement technical controls to detect and block RMM tool abuse (e.g., restrict execution of known RMM binaries to authorized admin paths).
- Update security awareness training to highlight "WhatsApp from friends" social engineering and localized phishing lures (Portuguese finance themes).
Related Resources
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