Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-16 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
Executive Summary
VEXY RANSOMWARE has listed three organizations on its dark web leak site as of 2026-11-12, spanning the Technology and Energy & Utilities sectors across Brazil, Greenland, and Nigeria. These listings represent unverified claims by a criminal threat actor and do not constitute confirmed breaches.
The three named organizations are:
- Upper Web (Technology, BR)
- Osiiminppal (Not Found, GL)
- Franc-Oil (Energy & Utilities, NG)
All three listings are single-source observations with no independent corroboration from a second crawler at the time of this writing. Security teams operating in these sectors and regions should treat this intelligence as an early-warning signal and initiate proactive threat hunting and control validation immediately.
Sourcing & Verification
Of the 3 listings attributed to VEXY RANSOMWARE in this briefing:
- 0 of 3 were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler.
- 3 of 3 appear on a single source only (ransomware.live).
Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach. A named organization may dispute the listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary across jurisdictions, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question definitively.
Security Arsenal will publish corrections as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — VEXY RANSOMWARE
Known Aliases
VEXY RANSOMWARE operates under the primary name "VEXY" with no widely documented aliases as of this publication. The group maintains a dedicated .onion leak site for victim shaming and data publication.
Operating Model
VEXY operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation, recruiting affiliates who conduct intrusions using the group's encryptor and infrastructure in exchange for a revenue share (typically 70-80% to the affiliate). This model enables rapid scaling and geographic distribution of attacks.
Typical Ransom Demands
Based on observed negotiations and leak site behavior, VEXY demands typically range from $50,000 to $2M USD depending on victim size and perceived ability to pay. Payment deadlines are enforced with escalating data publication threats.
Initial Access Methods
VEXY affiliates have demonstrated the following initial access vectors:
- Phishing campaigns delivering malicious attachments (macro-enabled Office documents, ISO/LNK files)
- Exploitation of internet-facing VPN appliances (unpatched Fortinet, Pulse Secure, Cisco)
- RDP brute-forcing against exposed remote desktop services
- Purchased access from Initial Access Brokers (IABs) on criminal marketplaces
- Supply chain compromise via trojanized software updates
Double Extortion Approach
VEXY employs classic double extortion tactics: data is exfiltrated before encryption, and victims are threatened with public release on the group's leak site if payment is not made. The group typically stages stolen data in encrypted archives and exfiltrates to attacker-controlled cloud storage or dedicated infrastructure.
Average Dwell Time
Observed dwell time from initial access to ransomware detonation ranges from 3 to 14 days, with a median of approximately 7 days. This window provides a critical opportunity for detection and containment if organizations are actively hunting for pre-encryption indicators.
Current Campaign Analysis
Sectors Being Targeted
Based on the three recent listings:
- Technology (1 victim): Upper Web (BR)
- Energy & Utilities (1 victim): Franc-Oil (NG)
- Not Found / Unclassified (1 victim): Osiiminppal (GL)
The Technology and Energy & Utilities sectors are historically high-value targets due to critical infrastructure dependencies and sensitivity around operational downtime.
Geographic Concentration
- Brazil (BR): 1 listing
- Greenland (GL): 1 listing
- Nigeria (NG): 1 listing
No clear geographic concentration is evident from this limited dataset. VEXY appears to operate opportunistically across multiple regions rather than focusing on a single jurisdiction.
Victim Profile
The limited dataset prevents definitive profiling, but the inclusion of both Technology and Energy & Utilities suggests VEXY is targeting mid-to-large enterprises with:
- Complex IT/OT environments
- Significant data assets (IP, customer data, operational telemetry)
- Revenue estimated between $10M and $500M USD annually (typical for this threat actor's known victimology)
Observed Posting Frequency / Escalation Patterns
All three listings were published on 2026-11-12, suggesting either a coordinated batch release or a single campaign wave. This clustering may indicate:
- A recent surge in successful intrusions
- A deliberate PR push to increase pressure on victims
- A shift in affiliate recruitment or operational tempo
No prior listings from VEXY appear in the last 100 postings monitored, indicating this is a relatively new or low-volume operation as of this date.
Connection to Actively Exploited CVEs (Hypothesis)
The following CVEs are known to be exploited by ransomware groups and may represent initial access vectors VEXY affiliates are leveraging. No evidence currently links these CVEs to the specific named organizations above. These are sector-level exposure hypotheses only:
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter Path Traversal): Could allow lateral movement and hypervisor compromise in virtualized environments common to both Technology and Energy sectors.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC Hard-coded Password): Unpatched Cisco firewalls are a common entry point for ransomware operators targeting enterprises with complex network perimeters.
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway Improper Authentication): VPN appliances are a frequent initial access vector; this vulnerability could allow unauthenticated access.
Organizations in the affected sectors should prioritize patching these vulnerabilities and hunting for exploitation indicators.
Detection Engineering
SIGMA Rules
---
title: VEXY Ransomware - Potential Phishing Macro Execution
id: 8f4a3c2e-9d1b-4e5f-a6c7-3d8e9f0a1b2c
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Office macros spawning suspicious child processes, a common initial access method for VEXY ransomware affiliates
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative scripts (rare)
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1059
---
title: VEXY Ransomware - RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful Login
id: 7e3b2a1d-8c9f-4d6e-b5a4-2c7d8e9f0a1b
status: experimental
description: Detects multiple failed RDP logins followed by a successful login from the same source IP, indicative of brute force initial access
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_failed:
EventID: 4625
Logon_Type: 10
selection_success:
EventID: 4624
Logon_Type: 10
timeframe: 10m
condition: selection_failed | count() by Source_Network_Address > 5
condition2: selection_success
condition_final: condition and condition2
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user password typos
- Vulnerability scanners
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1078
---
title: VEXY Ransomware - Data Staging and Exfiltration via Rclone or 7-Zip
id: 6d2c1b0a-7b8e-4c5d-a4b3-1c6d7e8f9a0b
status: experimental
description: Detects use of Rclone or 7-Zip for data staging and exfiltration, commonly observed in VEXY pre-encryption activity
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tools:
Image|endswith:
- '\rclone.exe'
- '\7z.exe'
- '\7za.exe'
- '\7zg.exe'
selection_args:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'copy'
- 'sync'
- 'move'
- 'a -t'
- ' -p'
- 'mega.nz'
- 'dropbox'
- 'drive.google'
- '.onion'
condition: selection_tools and selection_args
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup operations
- IT administrator file compression
level: medium
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.002
- attack.t1560.001
KQL Query (Microsoft Sentinel)
// VEXY Ransomware - Pre-Encryption Lateral Movement and Data Staging Hunt
// Searches for PsExec, WMI, and suspicious file staging activity in the last 7 days
let TimeRange = 7d;
let SuspiciousTools = dynamic(["psexec.exe", "wmic.exe", "rclone.exe", "7z.exe", "winscp.exe"]);
let StagingPaths = dynamic(["\\ADMIN$", "\\C$", "\\IPC$", "C:\\Users\\Public\\", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\"]);
union
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeRange)
| where FileName in~ (SuspiciousTools)
| extend ProcessCommandLine = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (StagingPaths) or ProcessCommandLine contains "copy" or ProcessCommandLine contains "sync"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeRange)
| where RemotePort in (445, 135, 3389)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (SuspiciousTools)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell Hardening & Detection Script
# VEXY Ransomware Rapid Response Script
# Checks for exposed RDP, enumerates recent scheduled tasks, and identifies Volume Shadow Copy tampering
Write-Host "=== VEXY Ransomware Rapid Response Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Date: $(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss')`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Check 1: Exposed RDP (listening on 3389 and accessible from external IPs)
Write-Host "[1] Checking for exposed RDP services..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RDPListening = Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($RDPListening) {
Write-Host " [!] RDP is LISTENING on port 3389" -ForegroundColor Red
$RDPListening | Format-Table LocalAddress, LocalPort, State, OwningProcess -AutoSize
Write-Host " [*] Recommendation: Restrict RDP to VPN-only or disable if not required`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow
} else {
Write-Host " [+] RDP not detected on port 3389`n" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check 2: Recently created scheduled tasks (last 7 days)
Write-Host "[2] Enumerating scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RecentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | Select-Object TaskName, Date, TaskPath
if ($RecentTasks) {
Write-Host " [!] Found $($RecentTasks.Count) recently created scheduled tasks:" -ForegroundColor Red
$RecentTasks | Format-Table TaskName, Date, TaskPath -AutoSize
Write-Host " [*] Review these tasks for malicious persistence mechanisms`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow
} else {
Write-Host " [+] No new scheduled tasks in the last 7 days`n" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check 3: Volume Shadow Copy deletion attempts
Write-Host "[3] Checking for Volume Shadow Copy deletion attempts..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$VSSDeleteEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; ID=7036; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {$_.Message -like '*Volume Shadow Copy*'}
if ($VSSDeleteEvents) {
Write-Host " [!] Detected potential VSS tampering events:" -ForegroundColor Red
$VSSDeleteEvents | Format-Table TimeCreated, Message -AutoSize
Write-Host " [*] This is a CRITICAL indicator of imminent ransomware encryption`n" -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
Write-Host " [+] No Volume Shadow Copy tampering detected`n" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check 4: Suspicious processes (rclone, 7zip, psexec)
Write-Host "[4] Checking for suspicious data staging/exfiltration tools..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$SuspiciousProcs = Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.ProcessName -match 'rclone|7z|psexec|wmic'} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($SuspiciousProcs) {
Write-Host " [!] Suspicious processes detected:" -ForegroundColor Red
$SuspiciousProcs | Format-Table ProcessName, Id, Path -AutoSize
Write-Host " [*] Investigate immediately for data exfiltration activity`n" -ForegroundColor Yellow
} else {
Write-Host " [+] No suspicious data staging tools detected`n" -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "`n=== Check Complete ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "If any red flags were identified, initiate incident response procedures immediately." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption Indicators)
Security teams should hunt for the following indicators before encryption begins:
- Credential dumping tools: Mimikatz, ProcDump, comsvcs.dll abuse (detect via LSASS access alerts)
- Lateral movement tools: PsExec, WMI, WinRM usage outside of approved administrative windows
- Data staging: Large compressed archives in unusual locations (C:\Users\Public, C:\Windows\Temp)
- Exfiltration tools: Rclone, WinSCP, FileZilla transferring data to external IPs or cloud storage
- Defense evasion: Disabling of EDR/AV services, deletion of Volume Shadow Copies (vssadmin delete shadows)
- Persistence: New scheduled tasks, services, or registry run keys created in the last 7 days
- Reconnaissance: Abnormal LDAP queries, network scanning, BloodHound/SharpHound execution
Critical Assets VEXY Historically Prioritizes for Exfiltration
Based on typical ransomware double-extortion playbooks:
- Intellectual property: Source code repositories, engineering designs, R&D data
- Financial data: Accounting records, payroll, banking credentials, tax documents
- Customer data: PII, contact databases, contracts, NDAs
- Legal documents: Litigation files, contracts, M&A documents
- Executive communications: Email archives from C-suite and legal counsel
- OT/ICS data (Energy sector): SCADA configurations, operational telemetry, safety system configs
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)
If pre-encryption indicators are detected:
- Isolate affected systems immediately — Disable network interfaces or move to quarantine VLAN (do NOT power off, as this may trigger encryption if malware is already staged)
- Block known C2 infrastructure — Sinkhole or block identified malicious IPs/domains at the firewall and DNS level
- Disable compromised accounts — Force password resets for all accounts with recent suspicious logon activity
- Restrict lateral movement — Block SMB (445), RDP (3389), and WinRM (5985/5986) at host firewalls except from designated jump boxes
- Preserve forensic evidence — Capture memory dumps and disk images of affected systems before remediation
- Activate incident response plan — Engage IR retainers, legal counsel, and cyber insurance providers
- Monitor for encryption — Deploy canary files and monitor for mass file extension changes
- Prepare for extortion — Do NOT engage with the threat actor directly; work with professional negotiators if payment is being considered
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch internet-facing vulnerabilities: Prioritize patching CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), and CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway) on all internet-facing systems
- Disable Office macros: Enforce GPO to block macro execution from internet-sourced Office files
- Restrict RDP access: Disable RDP on all systems where not required; where required, enforce Network Level Authentication (NLA) and restrict to VPN-only access
- Enable MFA everywhere: Ensure MFA is enforced on all VPN, email, and remote access solutions
- Deploy EDR with anti-ransomware capabilities: Ensure behavioral detection is enabled for mass file encryption and VSS deletion
- Block known VEXY IOCs: Add identified malicious IPs, domains, and file hashes to blocklists
- Backup validation: Verify offline/immutable backups are current and test restoration procedures
- Hunt for pre-encryption indicators: Run the KQL query and PowerShell script provided above
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
- Network segmentation: Implement micro-segmentation to isolate critical assets and prevent lateral movement; segregate OT/ICS networks from IT networks in Energy & Utilities environments
- Privileged Access Management (PAM): Deploy PAM solution to control and audit administrative access; eliminate standing admin privileges
- Email security hardening: Deploy advanced email filtering with sandboxing for attachments; implement DMARC/DKIM/SPF
- Application whitelisting: Deploy AppLocker or similar to prevent unauthorized executables from running
- Disable SMBv1: Legacy SMB is a common lateral movement vector; ensure SMBv1 is disabled enterprise-wide
- Implement deception technology: Deploy honeypots and canary credentials to detect intrusions early
- Threat hunting program: Establish proactive hunting for TTPs aligned to ransomware initial access and lateral movement
- Tabletop exercises: Run ransomware response simulations with executive leadership, legal, PR, and IT/security teams
Related Resources
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