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Vidar v1.5, Gremlin Stealer & Shai-Hulud: Multi-Vector Credential Theft Campaign

SA
Security Arsenal Team
May 20, 2026
5 min read

OTX Pulse data indicates a surge in credential theft operations leveraging both new malware technologies and software supply chains. Key developments include a Go-language rewrite of Vidar (v1.5) featuring aggressive sandbox evasion and Steam/Telegram C2, the evolution of Gremlin Stealer using instruction virtualization, and the resurgence of the Shai-Hulud worm via npm packages targeting developers. Concurrently, threat actors UAT-8616 and "The Gentlemen" are exploiting edge device vulnerabilities (Cisco SD-WAN, Fortinet) to deploy webshells (Godzilla, Behinder) and credential harvesters (SystemBC).

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Vidar v1.5 (Go Variant)

  • Distribution: Likely distributed via phishing attachments or SEO poisoning.
  • Payload Behavior: Native Go binary (1.25.4) acting as an infostealer. Targets browser credentials, crypto wallets, and Steam session data.
  • C2 Communication: Uses "dead-drop" resolvers. Instead of hard-coded C2 IPs, it fetches commands from public profiles on Telegram and Steam to bypass network detection.
  • Persistence/Defense: Heavy sandbox evasion using a 12-category scoring system to detect analysis environments. Includes AV killing capabilities.

Gremlin Stealer

  • Distribution: Malicious spam campaigns.
  • Payload Behavior: Highly obfuscated infostealer. It hides its malicious payload inside embedded resource files.
  • Anti-Analysis: Protected by a commercial packer utilizing instruction virtualization, converting code into custom bytecode executed by a private VM, making static analysis difficult.

Shai-Hulud (NPM Supply Chain)

  • Distribution: Typosquatting and copycat attacks on the Node Package Manager (npm) registry.
  • Payload Behavior: Worm that spreads by creating malicious packages like chalk-tempalte and axois-utils. Includes infostealer modules and DDoS botnet capabilities.
  • Target: Developers and build environments.

The Gentlemen / UAT-8616

  • Distribution: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in edge appliances (Fortinet CVE-2024-55591, Cisco CVE-2026-20182).
  • Payload Behavior: Initial access brokers deploying webshells (Godzilla, Behinder) and establishing persistence with SystemBC (a proxy tool) for lateral movement and data exfiltration.

IOC Analysis

The provided pulses offer a mix of high-fidelity and behavioral indicators:

  • File Hashes: Multiple MD5 and SHA256 hashes are provided for the Go-based Vidar sample, packed Gremlin Stealer variants, and webshells. These should be blocked in EDR and antivirus solutions.
  • Network Indicators: IPs associated with C2 infrastructure (e.g., 194.87.92.109) and Telegram/Steam endpoints are critical for perimeter blocking.
  • Software Packages: Specific npm package names (chalk-tempalte, @deadcode09284814/axios-util) are provided for supply chain validation.
  • CVEs: CVE-2026-20182 (Cisco SD-WAN) and CVE-2024-55591 (Fortinet) are critical for patch management prioritization.

Operization: SOC teams should import hashes into SIEM correlation engines for host telemetry hunting. Network IOCs should be added to firewall blocklists. DevOps teams must scan package-lock. files for the listed malicious packages.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: Potential Vidar Stealer v1.5 Activity
id: 8a4b2c1d-5e6f-4a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
description: Detects potential activity of Vidar Stealer v1.5 written in Go, characterized by accessing Steam or Telegram configuration directories for credential theft.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/05/20
references:
    - https://www.derp.ca/research/vidar-go-sandbox-dead-drop/
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.collection
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Steam\config\'
            - '\Telegram Desktop\tdata\'
    filter_legit:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\steam.exe'
            - '\Telegram.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup tools accessing these directories
level: high
---
title: Malicious NPM Package Installation (Shai-Hulud Copycat)
id: b5c3d2e1-6f7a-4b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
description: Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages associated with the Shai-Hulud copycat worm that steals credentials and crypto.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/05/20
references:
    - https://www.theregister.com/cyber-crime/2026/05/18/shai-hulud-copycat-hits-another-npm-package/
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.software_supply_chain
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\npm.cmd'
        - Image|endswith: '\node.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'chalk-tempalte'
            - '@deadcode09284814/axios-util'
            - 'axois-utils'
            - 'color-style-utils'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - None (Specific malicious package names)
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Webshell Creation via Web Server Process
id: c6d4e3f2-7a8b-5c9d-0e1f-2a3b4c5d6e7f
description: Detects potential webshell creation (Godzilla, Behinder) initiated by web server processes often exploited by UAT-8616 or The Gentlemen actors.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/05/20
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sd-wan-ongoing-exploitation/
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    category: file_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\java.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.aspx'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.php'
    filter:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\htdocs\'
    condition: selection and filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate web application updates
level: high

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for network connections to known C2 infrastructure from pulses
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIP in ("194.87.92.109", "176.65.139.31", "80.200.28.28", "149.154.167.99", "135.181.237.59")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

PowerShell Hunt Script

PowerShell
# Hunt for Vidar Stealer and Gremlin Stealer File Hashes
$targetHashes = @(
    "702ef1b4007f07887e9faaee0667b50b", # Vidar MD5
    "87332fcdf79e1c0bfb7713e9a52c0313", # Vidar MD5
    "1bd0a200528c82c6488b4f48dd6dbc818d48782a2e25ccd22781c5718c3f62f5", # Gremlin SHA256
    "d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa"  # XenShell SHA256
)

$drivesToScan = @("C:\", "D:\")

Write-Host "Scanning for malicious file hashes..."

foreach ($drive in $drivesToScan) {
    if (Test-Path $drive) {
        Get-ChildItem -Path $drive -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
            $file = $_
            try {
                $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $file.FullName -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction Stop).Hash.ToLower()
                if ($targetHashes -contains $hash) {
                    Write-Host "[ALERT] Suspicious file found: $($file.FullName) | Hash: $hash" -ForegroundColor Red
                }
            } catch {
                # Ignore errors for locked files or permission issues
            }
        }
    }
}

Response Priorities

Immediate

  • Block all listed IP addresses and domains at the firewall and proxy level.
  • Quarantine hosts matching the provided file hashes.
  • Hunt for the execution of npm install with the listed malicious package arguments.

24h

  • Conduct identity verification for users with potential credential exposure (Steam, Telegram, Browser saved passwords).
  • Review edge device logs (Cisco SD-WAN, Fortinet) for exploitation indicators of CVE-2026-20182 and CVE-2024-55591.

1 Week

  • Patch Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager and Fortinet appliances against the identified CVEs.
  • Enforce strict signing policies for internal npm packages and implement Software Composition Analysis (SCA) in CI/CD pipelines.
  • Review and restrict lateral movement pathways related to NTLM relay attacks.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

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