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Vidar/XMRig Factory-v3, Vanta, MacSync ClickFix, UNC6671 Vishing and Storm-2755 AiTM: OTX Credential-Theft Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
August 7, 2026
6 min read

The five pulses converge on one theme: industrialized credential and session theft feeding fraud, extortion and follow-on access. X3D MINER distributes password-protected cracked-software archives through malvertising, using Factory-v3 Go loaders to drop Vidar and XMRig while abusing rogue Authenticode, AMSI bypass and file inflation. Vanta shows a mature Python/PyArmor/PyInstaller stealer focused on Chromium credentials, Discord/Telegram tokens, gaming accounts, crypto wallets and VPN configs. MacSync brings the same wallet and browser theft model to macOS through ClickFix fake CAPTCHA lures that coerce users into running Terminal commands. UNC6671 and Storm-2755 bypass MFA at the identity layer: vishing to spoofed Okta/passkey portals and voicemail-themed AiTM proxies against Microsoft 365, then payroll diversion and SaaS data extortion.

Collectively, defenders should assume initial access is commodity, MFA is not sufficient where AiTM or helpdesk social engineering succeeds, and browser/token stores are the highest-value local target.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

  • X3D MINER / Vidar + XMRig: financially motivated; malvertising and cracked software SEO; Go Factory-v3 loaders; inflated files and password-protected archives to evade scanners; rogue code-signing; AMSI bypass; steals browser credentials and wallets, then deploys XMRig for cryptojacking. C2 is typically HTTPS to attacker infrastructure after staging from embedded or remotely fetched components.
  • Vanta Stealer: Python-based, PyInstaller packed and PyArmor protected; modular theft of Chromium data, Discord/Telegram tokens, Steam/Riot/Roblox/Minecraft artifacts, crypto wallets and Mullvad VPN configs; anti-analysis through obfuscation and packing; exfil likely via webhook/HTTPS after local collection into staged archives.
  • MacSync: macOS Go Mach-O payloads delivered after ClickFix Terminal execution; profiles host and architecture before payload selection; targets browser passwords, Apple artifacts and crypto wallets; infrastructure includes 138.124.118.69 and 193.29.224.151 with reported Aeza Group hosting linkage.
  • UNC6671: multi-brand extortion after BlackFile retirement narrative; brands include Redact, Pink, Helix and Falcon; vishing to personal mobiles while posing as IT; sends users to Okta/passkey lookalikes such as oktaenroll.com, idokta.com, myoktasso.com, mypasskeysso.com, setupssopasskey.com, passkeyms.com, keyokta.com and portalpasskey.com; AiTM captures sessions despite phishing-resistant MFA rollout gaps.
  • Storm-2755: Payroll Pirates BEC against healthcare, education, manufacturing and government in the US/Canada; voicemail lures pivot through legitimate services into OpenResty AiTM; hostname pattern includes idp.* and msauth.* such as idp.kualabemo.com, idp.keyreniao.com, idp.korminel.com and msauth.monlinelogicaline.com; objective is M365 session theft, mailbox rules and payroll rerouting.

IOC Analysis

Indicator types are file hashes for stealer/miner payloads, domains and hostnames for identity phishing, and IPv4 for macOS staging/C2. Hashes are best used for retro-hunting in EDR, email detonation, proxy download logs and threat-intel enrichment; do not rely on hashes alone because Go loaders and PyInstaller builds are repacked rapidly. Domains and hostnames are highest-value for DNS, proxy, TLS SNI and identity sign-in blocking because UNC6671 and Storm-2755 depend on lookalike SSO/AiTM infrastructure. IPs should be blocked at egress and used for netflow retrospective, but treat them as potentially short-lived bulletproof hosting.

Operationalize by pushing domains to DNS sinkhole and secure web gateway, IPs to firewall/EDR network isolation, hashes to EDR blocking and sandbox detonation, then enrich in OTX, VirusTotal, urlscan.io, MISP and your SIEM. Decode AiTM pivots from proxy click logs and correlate with Entra ID sign-in logs for impossible travel, token replay and new MFA registration events.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: Factory-v3 Go Loader or Cracked Software Archive Execution
id: 9e1a2f10-8a7c-4b1f-9d2a-vidar001
status: experimental
description: Detects password-protected cracked software launches and Go loader behavior consistent with Vidar/XMRig malvertising delivery
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/08/07
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_archive:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\7z.exe'
      - '\WinRAR.exe'
      - '\rar.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' -p'
      - 'crack'
      - 'keygen'
      - 'setup'
  selection_loader:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
      - '\Downloads\'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'factory'
      - 'xmrig'
      - 'vidar'
  condition: selection_archive or selection_loader
fields:
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - ParentImage
  - Hashes
falsepositives:
  - legitimate software packaging and IT admin archive use
level: high
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1204
  - attack.t1027
---
title: ClickFix Terminal Execution and macOS Stealer Staging
id: 2c7b7a20-4c91-4d6a-macsync002
status: experimental
description: Detects user-coerced Terminal execution followed by curl or osascript staging associated with MacSync fake CAPTCHA intrusions
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/08/07
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: macos
detection:
  selection_terminal:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/Terminal'
      - '/bash'
      - '/zsh'
      - '/curl'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'curl '
      - ' -o '
      - 'chmod +x'
      - 'osascript'
      - 'captcha'
      - 'verify'
  condition: selection_terminal and selection_cmd
fields:
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - ParentImage
falsepositives:
  - developer shell activity
level: high
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1204
  - attack.t1105
---
title: Okta Passkey or M365 AiTM Phishing Domain Resolution
id: 71aa9d30-77d1-4f0e-aitm003
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS or web access to UNC6671 passkey/Okta lookalikes and Storm-2755 AiTM identity proxy hostnames
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/08/07
logsource:
  category: dns
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_domains:
    query|contains:
      - 'oktaenroll.com'
      - 'idokta.com'
      - 'myoktasso.com'
      - 'mypasskeysso.com'
      - 'setupssopasskey.com'
      - 'passkeyms.com'
      - 'keyokta.com'
      - 'portalpasskey.com'
      - 'idp.kualabemo.com'
      - 'idp.keyreniao.com'
      - 'idp.korminel.com'
      - 'msauth.monlinelogicaline.com'
  condition: selection_domains
fields:
  - query
  - answer
  - Image
falsepositives:
  - threat research or blockpage verification
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1557
  - attack.t1071
  - attack.t1656
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
let PhishDomains = dynamic(['oktaenroll.com','idokta.com','myoktasso.com','mypasskeysso.com','setupssopasskey.com','passkeyms.com','keyokta.com','portalpasskey.com']);
let AiTMHosts = dynamic(['idp.kualabemo.com','idp.keyreniao.com','idp.korminel.com','msauth.monlinelogicaline.com']);
let BadIPs = dynamic(['138.124.118.69','193.29.224.151']);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (PhishDomains) or RemoteUrl has_any (AiTMHosts) or RemoteIP in (BadIPs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('crack','keygen','xmrig','vidar','factory','curl ','chmod +x','osascript','captcha','verify')
   or FileName has_any ('7z.exe','WinRAR.exe','bash','zsh','curl','Terminal')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, SHA256)
| order by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$domains = @('oktaenroll.com','idokta.com','myoktasso.com','mypasskeysso.com','setupssopasskey.com','passkeyms.com','keyokta.com','portalpasskey.com','idp.kualabemo.com','idp.keyreniao.com','idp.korminel.com','msauth.monlinelogicaline.com')
$ips = @('138.124.118.69','193.29.224.151')
Write-Output '[+] Active remote connections'
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $ips -contains $_.RemoteAddress } | Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,State,OwningProcess
Write-Output '[+] DNS cache hits'
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $d = $_.Entry; $domains | Where-Object { $d -like ('*' + $_ + '*') } } | Select-Object Entry,RecordName,RecordType,TimeToLive,Data
Write-Output '[+] Suspicious user-writable executables'
Get-ChildItem -Path $env:USERPROFILEullet
Get-ChildItem -Path $env:USERPROFILE
Downloads,$env:USERPROFILEullet
Desktop,$env:APPDATA,$env:LOCALAPPDATA -Recurse -Include *.exe,*.dll,*.scr,*.pkg,*.dmg -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-14) } | Select-Object FullName,Length,LastWriteTime
Write-Output '[+] Persistence keys'
Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:ullet
Softwareullet
Microsoftullet
Windowsullet
CurrentVersionullet
Run','HKLM:ullet
Softwareullet
Microsoftullet
Windowsullet
CurrentVersionullet
Run' | Select-Object *
Write-Output '[+] Recent scheduled tasks'
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-14) -or $_.Actions.Execute -match 'powershell|curl|bash|rundll32|mshta' } | Select-Object TaskName,TaskPath,State,Actions

Response Priorities

  • Immediate: block the listed domains, hostnames and IPs at DNS, proxy, firewall and EDR; quarantine hosts with matching hashes or Downloads/AppData execution; disable sessions for users who visited AiTM pages; preserve browser, token, keychain and mailbox artifacts.
  • 24h: force password resets and revoke refresh tokens for exposed identities; require re-registration of MFA/passkeys after verified helpdesk contact; review Entra ID/Okta sign-ins, new device enrollment, inbox rules, payroll bank changes and SaaS export logs; rotate exposed Discord/Telegram/session tokens and crypto wallet credentials.
  • 1 week: deploy phishing-resistant MFA with number matching and conditional access for SSO enrollment, restrict helpdesk reset workflows with out-of-band verification, block password-protected archives from malvertising categories, enforce macOS Gatekeeper/MDM controls against Terminal ClickFix lures, and add detections above to AlertMonitor and Sentinel analytics.

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